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LIABILITY OF SURVIVING JOINT
TENANT FOR DEBTS OF DECEASED
JOINT OWNER
A Review of Section 30-624
Nebraska Revised Statutes
I. INTRODUCTION
Problems arising under decedents' estates, joint tenancy, and
creditor's rights were greatly increased by the 1955 enactment of
Section 30-624 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. This statute is
peculiar to Nebraska' and for this reason judicial determinations
from other states are of very little value in solving the problems
arising under this act. The purpose of this article is to review these
problems, in the light of Nebraska law and court decisions as an
aid to their solution.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
L.B. 1972 was sponsored by persons who thought that joint ten-
ancy was being used to avoid the payment of debts. Although the
sponsors did not want to eliminate joint tenancy, they thought that
the property in joint tenancy should be liable for the payment of
the debts of the deceased joint owner.3 As originally introduced,
L.B. 197 made all jointly held real or personal property-specifically
including joint bank and savings and loan accounts-liable for the
debts of the deceased joint owner.4 The Standing Committee made
minor amendments to the bill;5 however, these amendments were
1 Kindler v. Kindler, 169 Neb. 153, 98 N.W.2d 881 (1959).
2 L.B. 197 was the bill number for what is now NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
624 (Reissue 1956).
3 Ginsburg, Review of Legislation Affecting Real Estate, Probate and
Trusts Passed by the 1955 Nebraska Legislature (Nebraska State Bar
Association Proceedings, 1955), 35 NEB. L. REV. 297 (1956).
4 Neb. Leg. Jour., 67th Sess., 190 (1955).
5 Id. at 1008.
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rejected and the bill was amended on the floor of the legislature
to read essentially as it did for final reading.6
The title to the bill as amended stated:
A bill for an act relating to decedents' estates; to make the sur-
viving joint owner or owners of jointly held real or personal
property liable for the debts and obligations of the deceased joint
owner or owners .... 7
The act itself makes the surviving joint owner of "real or personal
property in joint tenancy" personally liable to "a creditor or per-
sonal representative of the deceased joint owner" for the amount
that the deceased joint owner "contributed to the jointly owned
property" under certain circumstances. The action must be brought
"in a court of competent jurisdiction" within three months after
the death of the decedent but only when the assets of the deceased
joint tenant are insufficient to pay his debts and obligations. The
recovery, if any, is subject to all homestead and "legal exemptions"
of the decedent in the property."
It will be noted that the bill as enacted differs from the bill
as originally introduced in two very important aspects. First, the
liability is placed on the survivor personally rather than on the
property, and second, those jointly held accounts covered by Sec-
tions 8-157 and 8-3171 are not specifically included as they were in
the original bill.
After quoting the entire statute and title, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court gave some indication as to what the statute "attempts
to provide" by stating in Kindler v. Kindler:10
It will be noted that the language in the title of section 30-624,
R.R.S. 1943, as originally enacted, and the act itself as well, relates
to "decedents' estates" and attempts to provide a conditional liabil-
ity of the surviving joint tenant for debts and obligations of a de-
ceased joint tenant as a lawfully existing asset of his estate with
which to pay his creditors."
6 Id. at 1359.
7 Id. at- 1503.
8 NEB. REV. STAT. §.30-624 (Reissue 1956).
9 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-167, -317 (Reissue 1954).
10 169 Neb. 153, 159, 98 N.W.2d 881, 885 (1959).
11 Although this quote is dictum in the case, it constitutes the only state-
ment of the Nebraska Supreme Court as to what is provided by the
statute in question. In DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 574, 76 N.W.2d
733, 737 (1956), the court did mention the statute but only to state that
it did not abolish joint tenancy.
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III. JURISDICTION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
Although the question of constitutionality of Section 30-624 has
not been litigated before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the question
was recently presented in the case of Buehler v. Kirby,12 an action
instituted in the Lancaster District Court. In that case, District
Judge Paul W. White held the statute to be "a direct and very
catastrophic interference with the necessarily exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the county court.'
13
As partial support for this holding,14 Judge White, following
the reasoning of Rehn v. Bingaman,"i emphasized that the county
court has original, exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of
claims against a deceased person.16 A claim includes every species
of liability for which the estate can be called upon to provide pay-
ment.17 Therefore, an original action in the district court based
upon a claim against a deceased joint tenant, an action apparently
allowed by Section 30-624,18 would be an extension of the district
court jurisdiction into the realm of the original, exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the county court-an extension contrary to the Constitution
and statutes of this state.19
12Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 198, p. 187, Dist. Ct. of Lancaster County,
Nebr. (1959).
13Ibid. Judge White declared the statute unconstitutional and therefore
the plaintiff's cause of action based upon the statute was dismissed.
14 Several of the remaining reasons for Judge White's holding are discussed
throughout this article. See also 39 NEB. L. REV. 339 (1960).
15 151 Neb. 196, 204, 36 N.W.2d 856, 861 (1949).
16 NEB. CONST. art. V, § 16 states: "County courts . . . shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased
persons. . . ." NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-503 (Reissue 1956) makes this
original jurisdiction exclusive. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-504 states: "The
county court shall have power to hear and determine claims . . . in the
matter of estates of deceased persons ...
17 In re Edwards, 138 Neb. 671, 675, 294 N.W. 422, 425 (1940).
Is "The statute by its very terms, and implicit in it, contemplates that
there is jurisdiction within the county court to accomplish the same pur-
pose for the creditor that is embodied in the statute, but provides that
if a certain time element passes and if there is proof of insolvency that
then an independent action may be taken up in the district court."
Buehler v. Kirby, Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 198, p. 187, Dist. Ct. of
Lancaster County, Nebr. (1959).
19 "Where a statute upon a particular subject has provided a special tri-
bunal for the determination of questions pertaining to such subject, the
jurisdiction of such tribunal is exclusive, unless otherwise expressed or
clearly implied from the act." Hendreshke v. Harvard High School Dis-
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IV. EFFECT ON JOINT TENANCY
Although the title of the bill related the act to decedents' es-
tates, 20 the act itself has a major effect upon joint tenancy although
this effect may be considered indirect.2'
A. EFFECT ON THE LAND
Since the statute creates a personal liability on the survivingjoint owner rather than impressing a lien upon the property, it does
not abrogate the strict interpretation of the common law rule that
the survivor takes title free and clear of the debts of the deceasedjoint owner. Therefore, one of the major objections to the bill as
first introduced is eliminated-it does not put a restraint on aliena-
tion.22 However, because of the limit of liability and the provision
of personal liability to the creditors, the act places a great burden
on the surviving joint tenant personally.
B. EFFECT ON THE SURVIVOR
The survivor is liable for only that amount which the deceased
contributed to the jointly owned property. Therefore, if the prop-
erty has increased in value over the original investment, the sur-
vivor gets the full benefit of the increase. But, if the property has
decreased in value, the survivor must stand the full loss. Should
the value of the deceased's contribution be less than the unsatis-
fied claims, the statute would seem to require a race by the cred-
itors to get judgment against the survivor and thereby satisfy their
claims.23
As pointed out by Judge White in Buehler v. Kirby,24 the act
trict, 35 Neb. 400, 401, 53 N.W. 204, 205 (1892). See also Stewart v. Herten,
125 Neb. 210, 249 N.W. 552 (1933). It seems apparent that such a "special
tribunal," the county court, has been provided to deal with claims against
the deceased. See note 16 supra.20 Neb. Leg. Jour., 67th Sess., 1503. See also Kindler v. Kindler, 169 Neb.
153, 159, 98 N.W.2d 881, 885 (1959).
21 "This [L.B. 197, later NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-624 (Reissue 1956)] also
purports to be, by its title, an act relating to decedents' estates. How-
ever, it does not affect decedents' estates but affects the law of joint
tenancy." Ginsburg, Review of Legislation Affecting Real Estate, Pro-
bate and Trusts Passed by the 1955 Nebraska Legislature (Nebraska
State Bar Association Proceedings, (1955) 35 NEB. L. REV. 297, 307
(1956).
22 See Ibid.
23 Buehler v. Kirby, Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 198, p. 187, Dist. Ct. of
Lancaster County, Nebr. (1959).
24 Ibid.
COMMENTS
permits the survivor to be plagued with a multiplicity of suits.
Assuming that the amount contributed by the decedent would sat-
isfy the claims of several creditors, each could bring an action to
satisfy his claim. The other creditors and the personal representa-
tive would apparently not be "necessary parties '25 nor would the
survivor meet the requirements for interpleader.
26 Intervention 27
may or may not aid the situation depending on whether it is allowed
and whether the other creditors or the personal representative elect
to come into the action brought by another creditor.
28
A judicial determination of the amount contributed by the de-
cedent to the jointly owned property probably would not be a bar
to a determination of this same fact in a subsequent action brought
by another creditor.2 9 However, if the first action was brought by
the personal representative who determined and collected the
amount contributed by the deceased joint owner, a subsequent ac-
tion would be highly improbable, if not impossible.
30
25 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-323 (Reissue 1956). "By statute the court is
only required to order new parties to an action when a determination of
the controversy cannot be had without the presence of the other parties."
Dent v. City of North Platte, 148 Neb. 718, 721, 28 N.W.2d 562, 564 (1947).
See also Cunningham v. Brewer, 144 Neb. 218, 16 N.W.2d 533 (1944). It
would seem that the other creditors and the personal representative
would not be necessary to determine the controversy between the instant
creditor and the survivor.
26 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-325 (Reissue 1956). In Farming Corporation v.
Bridgeport Bank, 113 Neb. 323, 327, 202 N.W. 911, 913 (1925), the court
stated that the essential conditions to bringing interpleader are: "(1)
The same thing, debt or duty, must be claimed by both or all of the par-
ties against whom the relief is demanded. (2) All their adverse titles or
claims must be dependent, or be derived from a common source. (3) The
person asking the relief ... must not have nor claim any interest in the
subject matter. (4) He must have incurred no independent liability to
either of the claimants; that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent be-
tween them, in the position merely of a stakeholder."
27 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-328 (Reissue 1956).
28 The party seeking to intervene must have a "direct and immediate inter-
est" so that he "will either lose or gain by the direct operation and legal
effect of the judgment." Cornhusker Electric Co. v. City of Fairbury,
131 Neb. 888, 270 N.W. 482 (1936). See also City of Omaha v. Douglas
County, 125 Neb. 640, 251 N.W. 262 (1933). It would seem that the cred-
itors and the personal representative would meet this test as a determina-
tion of the amount contributed would be of direct interest to them and
they could stand to lose by operation of the judgment.
29 See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) and illustrations there-
under.
30 See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 80, 85 (1942). It is possible that
the personal representative would be considered as acting in a fiduciary
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V. BANK AND SAVINGS & LOAN ACCOUNTS
Joint bank and savings and loan accounts, specifically included
in the bill as originally introduced, were not included in Section
30-624 as enacted. 31 It may be argued that this factor is indicative
of the intention of the legislature to exclude such accounts from
the effect of the statute. This argument is further supplemented by
the fact that the statute used the words "property in joint tenancy"
and the accounts given the right to survivorship by Sections 8-167
and 8-31732 are not, or at least do not have to be, held in joint ten-
ancy.33
The argument for the inclusion of such accounts within the
scope of Section 30-624 is aided by the title of the bill. The title,
from the time of the bill's introduction until its enactment, referred
to "jointly held" property rather than "property in joint tenancy. '34
In addition, the legislature has granted the right of survivorship to
such jointly held accounts thereby disregarding previous judicial
pronouncements concerning technical aspects of joint tenancy when
dealing with bank and savings and loan accounts. 35 To achieve the
purpose of the sponsors of the bill,36 it would seem that the legis-
capacity towards the general creditors to collect an asset out of which the
creditors could be paid. If this were the case, the creditors would be
bound by the action brought by the personal representative. This possi-
bility, combined with the difficulty of proving a larger contribution and
with the three month time limit, would probably make a subsequent
action by a creditor impractical. It should also be noted that if two
actions were instituted, within the three month period, in the same
county, they would probably be consolidated. However, if these actions
were instituted in different counties, the consolidation would not be
possible.
31 Compare Neb. Leg. Jour., 67th Sess., 190 (1955), with NEB. REV. STAT. §
30-624 (Reissue 1956).
32 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-167, -317 (Reissue 1954).
33 See First Trust Co. of Lincoln, Nebr. v. Hammond, 140 Neb. 330, 299
N.W. 496 (1941), opinion supplemented 140 Neb. 339, 300 N.W. 808 (1941),
opinion supplemented 141 Neb. 756, 4 N.W.2d 756 (1942); Tobias v. Mutual
Building & Loan Ass'n, 147 Neb. 676, 24 N.W.2d 870 (1946); Whiteside v.
Whiteside, 159 Neb. 362, 67 N.W.2d 141 (1954). See also Ginsberg, Effect
of Owner's Execution of Land Contract or Mortgage Upon a Joint Ten-
ancy (Nebraska State Bar Association Proceedings, 1954) 34 NEB. L.
REV. 280, 282 (1955).
34 See Neb. Leg. Jour., 67th Sess., 190, 1008 and 1503 (1955).
35 Tobias v. Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n, 147 Neb. 676, 680, 24 N.W.2d
870, 873 (1946).
.16 Ginsburg, Review of Legislation Affecting Real Estate, Probate and
Trusts Passed by the 1955 Nebraska Legislature (Nebraska State Bar
Association Proceedings, 1955), 35 NEB. L. REV. 297 (1956).
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lature again intended to include in "joint tenancy" those accounts
not technically includable in the term.
The inclusion or exclusion of jointly owned bank and savings
and loan accounts within the scope of Section 30-624 is a matter
that needs judicial or legislative clarification.
VI. EFFECT ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES
Presumably, a recovery under Section 30-624 by the "personal
representative of the deceased joint owner" would become an asset
of the estate and be distributed in the normal course of the probate
proceedings.37 However, if the creditor institutes the action, the
effects under the statute would be "squarely within the vices which
in the determination of estates the Constitution sought to prevent. '38
The first of these "vices" is the opportunity of the estate to
contest the merits of the creditors' claim. Would the claimant bear
the burden of proving the exact amount contributed by the de-
ceased joint tenant?39 Would the surviving joint owner be required
to challenge the merits of a claim against the deceased? Judge
White has stated:
The primary determination in the lawsuit would be only the
amount that [the deceased] owned in the joint property, and yet
this statute contemplates a necessary adjudication as to the valid-
ity and the amount of the claim for a determination of the matter
which is merged in a final judgment and would naturally be con-
clusive between the parties. Obviously, the deceased is protected
in this matter in the county court .... 40
37 Kindler v. Kindler, 169 Neb. 153, 159, 98 N.W.2d 881, 885 (1959). For a
general review of Nebraska probate procedure in regard to claims against
the estate of a decedent, see 39 NEB. L. REV. 323 (1960).
38 Buehler v. Kirby, Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 198, p. 187, Dist. Ct. of
Lancaster County, Nebr. (1959).
39 It seems reasonable to assume that the claimant would have to prove
that the deceased contributed at least enough to the joint ownership
of the property to permit the claimant to recover his claim or a portion
thereof. However, should the amount contributed be more than the
amount of the claim, would the claimant have to prove the exact amount
contributed? This would seem unnecessary. Also, the facts as to the
amount contributed by the deceased joint owner would be peculiarly
within the knowledge of the surviving joint owner and, applying the
general rule in such instances, could be alleged with less certainty than
would otherwise be necessary. See the general rule set out in Graham
v. Graham, 135 Neb. 761, 770, 284 N.W. 280, 285 (1939). The necessity of
the survivor alleging in particular terms may shift the burden of proof
over to him if the rule that "he who pleads must also prove" is applied.
40Buehler v. Kirby, Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 198, p. 187, Dist. Ct. of
Lancaster County, Nebr. (1959).
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Another of these "vices" is the detrimental effect which a cred-
itor's suit would have on the priority provisions of the probate
code.41 Under the statute being considered, a creditor with a tort
claim, another with a claim for funeral expenses, and the personal
representative trying to collect for a widow's allowance are all on
equal footing as to recovery from the survivor. Again, an action
allowed by the personal representative alone to recover this "asset"
and distribute it in the probate proceedings would alleviate the
problems.
VII. CONCLUSION
The policy of Section 30-624, making the survivor liable for the
debts of the deceased joint owner under the circumstances provided
by the statute, is not questioned. However, the procedure provided
for by the statute, through which the sponsors of the bill attempted
to attain their purpose,42 is seriously challenged. The author believes
the problems discussed in this article are sufficient to merit an
amendment to Section 30-624 and makes the following recommenda-
tions to alleviate these problems:
43
1. When the assets of the estate are insufficient to satisfy the
claims of creditors, the personal representative of the deceased
joint owner may bring an action against the surviving joint owner
to collect the amount contributed by the deceased to the jointly
owned property.
2. Upon application by the creditors, the same paying part of
the costs of the litigation, the personal representative becomes
bound to bring this action.
3. The recovery by the personal representative then becomes
an asset of the estate to be appropriated in the same manner as
other funds in the hands of the personal representative.
4. Jointly held property regulated by Sections 8-167 and 8-317
should either be expressly included or excluded from coverage by
the statute.
Charles F. Noren, '61
41 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-103, -615 (Reissue 1956).
42 See note 36 supra.
43 It will be noted that the recommendations follow closely the pro-
cedure set out in those sections of the statutes dealing with fraudulent
conveyances by the decendent. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-415 to -17
(Reissue 1956).
